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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Talena Hampton raised three issues on appeal. She first argued the district court abused
its discretion by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of her posting bonds in other
counties. In response, the State does not dispute this evidentiary error, but argues the error was
harmless. Second, Ms. Hampton argued the district court committed by reversible error by
denying her motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of her four outstanding warrants
and past methamphetamine purchase. The State again does not dispute the impropriety of this
evidence, but argues the evidence was harmless and a mistrial was not necessary. Finally,
Ms. Hampton argued the State did not prove the charge of aiding and abetting aggravated assault
beyond a reasonable doubt because no evidence showed more than her mere know ledge or
acquiescence. The State disagrees and claims the evidence was sufficient.
Ms. Hampton now replies to the State's harmless error, mistrial, and sufficiency of the
evidence arguments.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hampton's Appellant's Brief articulated the statement of facts and course of
proceedings. (App. Br., pp.1-5.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of
Ms. Hampton's bonds in other counties to prove identity?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. Hampton's motion for a mistrial after the jury
heard improper testimony on Ms. Hampton's warrants in other counties and her
methamphetamine purchase?

III.

Did the State prove Ms. Hampton aided and abetted Mr. Herrera in his assault with a gun
when the evidence showed nothing more than her mere know ledge, acqmescence, or
assent in his crime?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence Of Ms. Hampton's
Bonds In Other Counties
The State concedes the district court abused its discretion by admitting Mr. Crumbley' s
testimony that his supervisor posted bonds for Ms. Hampton in Ada and Elmore Counties. (Resp.
Br., p.7; Tr. Vol. 1, 1 p.185, Ls.20-24.) The State maintains, however, this evidentiary error is
harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.7-12.) The State has not met its burden.
The State first asserts this error is harmless because the jury heard similar evidence from
other witnesses. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Mr. White testified that Mr. Crumbley was looking for
Ms. Hampton because "she had a warrant or something from some other county or whatever,"
and Mr. Crumbley testified that he knew Ms. Hampton because "she was one of our clients that
failed to appear on us and we had to bring her back in." (Tr. Vol. I, p.154, Ls.3--4, p.185, Ls.34.) Both of these statements are vague in comparison to Mr. Crumbley's improper testimony, and
these statements reference a single encounter with Viking Bail Bonds. The first statement refers
to a warrant "or something . . . or whatever." (Tr. Vol. I, p.154, Ls.3--4.) And the second
statement refers to the events surrounding the alleged bail bondsman scheme and
Mr. Crumbley's subsequent search for Ms. Hampton and Mr. Herrera. (Tr. Vol. I, p.185, Ls.2--4,
Ls.17-21.) Thus, these statements reference Ms. Hampton's failure to appear and a warrant
linked to Mr. Crumbley's search for her immediately after the instant offenses. This evidence is
far less prejudicial than the improperly admitted evidence of at least two other past criminal
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There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains day one of the jury
trial. The second, cited as Volume II, contains day two of the jury trial. The third, cited as
Volume III, contains the sentencing hearing.
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offenses in two other counties and subsequent bonds. As discussed in Ms. Hampton's
Appellant's Brief, this is irrelevant evidence that showed nothing other than criminal propensity.
(App. Br., pp.8-12.) Mr. White's and Mr. Crumbley's nonspecific testimony in reference to the
instant offenses and subsequent investigation do not render the error harmless.
Second, the State argues the error is harmless because Ms. Hampton also testified about a
bail bond. (Resp. Br., p.9.) Similar to Mr. White's and Mr. Crumbley's testimony,
Ms. Hampton's testimony refers to the events surrounding the instant offenses, not prior bad
acts. Ms. Hampton testified that she had "just bonded out" on a misdemeanor and owed Viking
Bail Bonds $100. (Tr. Vol. II, p.290, Ls.6-8, p.293, L.19.) Ms. Hampton provided this testimony
to explain why she was willing to help Mr. White "get his girlfriend out," since Mr. White would
pay the money she owed to Viking Bail Bonds. (Tr. Vol. II, p.290, Ls.8-11.) Again, this
testimony is far less prejudicial than evidence of other bonds in other counties from the State's
witness.
Third, the State contends the error is harmless because Ms. Hampton informed the jury in
opening statements about her bonds. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) For one, the jury was explicitly
instructed "arguments and statements by lawyers" are not evidence, (R., p.113), so the State
cannot rely on Ms. Hampton's opening statement as "repetitive evidence" of Ms. Hampton's
bonds. (Resp. Br., p.10.) But, more importantly, Ms. Hampton's opening statement is not an
admission of other bonds and warrants. To the contrary, Ms. Hampton's opening statement
informed the jury that the bail bondsman would say they have "a lot of felony warrants out of
Elmore County," but "[t]here are no warrants, except maybe a battery one, out of Elmore
County." (Tr. Vol. I, p.123, Ls.18-24 (emphasis added).) She further stated, "This is a very
unusual situation why a bail bondsman are [sic] undertaking their own investigation when she
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doesn't have violations offelony warrants as they claimed." (Tr. Vol. I, p.123, L.24-p.124, L.2
(emphasis added).) This statement, therefore, informed the jury that Mr. Crumbley would testify
that he searched for Ms. Hampton because of felony warrants in Elmore County, but he was
actually mistaken about the warrants. Once again, these statements reference a current warrant
that prompted Mr. Crumbley's investigation. They did not inform the jury that Mr. Crumbley
would testify about irrelevant prior bad acts.
Finally, the State maintains the overwhelming evidence of guilt renders this evidentiary
error harmless. (Resp. Br., pp. I 0-11.) Ms. Hampton respectfully disagrees and notes the proper
standard is not merely "overwhelming evidence." The State must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
(2010). She submits the State has not met its burden.
For these reasons, and those stated in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hampton maintains the
district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant, prejudicial evidence of her bonds in
other counties. (App. Br., pp.7-12.)

II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Hampton's Motion For A Mistrial After The Jury
Heard Improper Testimony On Ms. Hampton's Warrants In Other Counties And Her
Methamphetamine Purchase
The State does not dispute Ms. Hampton's position that Mr. Crumbley's testimony of her
warrants out of four counties was irrelevant, prejudicial evidence. (App. Br., pp.12-15, 16; Resp.
Br., pp.12-14.) The State also does not dispute her position that Officer Rivers's testimony of
her past methamphetamine purchase was irrelevant, prejudicial evidence. (App. Br., pp.15, 17.)
Instead, the State asserts this prejudicial evidence was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.14-19.)
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Ms. Hampton respectfully disagrees. She maintains this evidence prejudiced the jury against her
and required a mistrial. (App. Br., pp.17-18.)
First, the State argues the improperly admitted evidence of Ms. Hampton's warrants in
other counties was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) As
argued in Part I here, the "evidence" relied upon by the State is either not evidence, i.e.,
Ms. Hampton's opening statement, or part and parcel of the instant offenses, i.e., the failure to
appear and warrant that prompted Mr. Crumbley's involvement. These facts are not nearly as
prejudicial as the evidence of "warrants out of Ada, Elmore, Jerome, and Twin." (Tr. Vol. I,
p.192, Ls.12-13.) That evidence implies Ms. Hampton essentially went on a crime-spree in
Southern Idaho. Ms. Hampton asserts the State's reliance on this other information does not
negate the prejudicial effect of the improperly admitted evidence. 2
Second, the State relies on Ms. Hampton's testimony of her outstanding warrants to show
this evidentiary error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.15-17.) The State cannot use Ms. Hampton's
reaction to an erroneous ruling to show the error was harmless. The State's use of
Ms. Hampton's testimony to negate this evidentiary error requires an assumption that she would
have testified about her warrants regardless of Mr. Crumbley's improper testimony. But the State
has absolutely no evidence in the record to support its assumption. By using Ms. Hampton's
testimony, the State is trying to prove this error did not contribute to the outcome by imagining a
trial without the error. That is the incorrect standard for harmless error. The standard is "is not
what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury,
but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand." State v. Thomas, 157

2

Unlike the evidence of Ms. Hampton's past methamphetamine purchase, the district court did
not strike the warrants evidence from the record or instruct the jury to disregard it.
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Idaho 916, 919 (2015) (Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). Moreover, the evidence
in the record indicates Ms. Hampton would have testified differently but for this improperly
admitted evidence. Ms. Hampton objected to Mr. Crumbley's testimony and moved for a
mistrial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.192, Ls.24-25, p.193, L.24-p.194, L.21.) Ms. Hampton also recognized
her Catch-22 situation that cross-examination would draw the jury's attention to the warrants, but
not cross-examining would prevent her from challenging her warrant status. (Tr. Vol. I, p.198,
L.21-p.199, L.2, p.201, L.22-p.202, L.2 (stating Ms. Hampton actually did not have warrants in
those four counties, contrary to Mr. Crumbley's testimony, but not wanting to make "things
worse" by bringing up the warrants again).) Ms. Hampton's statements are a clear indication she
did not want this evidence before the jury. It shows Ms. Hampton was well-aware of this
evidence and its prejudicial effect. It stands to reason that Ms. Hampton would have limited her
testimony on her prior bad acts if Mr. Crumbley had not volunteered this prejudicial information.
The same goes for Officer Rivers's testimony on Ms. Hampton's past methamphetamine
purchase. The State also points to Ms. Hampton's testimony on her drug use to establish
harmless error. (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) The State speculates that Ms. Hampton would have
testified about her drug use absent Officer Rivers' s testimony. This speculation on what would
have happened at an error-free trial is insufficient to prove harmlessness. Therefore,
Ms. Hampton contests the State's use of her testimony after the district court's adverse ruling to
prove harmless error.
Along the same lines, Ms. Hampton disputes the State's view that her reliance on State v.
Guinn, 114 Idaho 30 (Ct. App. 1988), is misplaced. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) Guinn provides

guidance on the State's attempt to use Ms. Hampton's testimony against her to negate the district
court's evidentiary errors. Guinn acknowledges a defendant's later admission on the stand to

7

improperly admitted evidence does not waive his objection or mistrial motion on that improper
evidence. 114 Idaho at 34. Guinn further recognizes a defendant may seek "to defuse the impact
of' the improperly admitted evidence "by explaining" it to the jury during his testimony. Id. But
Guinn does not require the defendant to prove on appeal that his trial strategy was to defuse the

improper evidence if the district court ruled against him on his motion for a mistrial. This would
require the appellate courts to delve into defense counsel's tactics and contingencies based on
hypothetical rulings at trial. And it would shift the burden of harmlessness to the defendant.
Contrary to the State's argument, Guinn does not require evidence by the defense to disprove a
"waiver of the earlier objection." Id. Rather, it simply does not fault the defendant for responding
to improperly admitted evidence.
Next, the State relies on the district court's decision to sustain Ms. Hampton's objection
to Officer Rivers's testimony to prove his testimony did not prejudice her. (Resp. Br., pp.17-18.)
Although Ms. Hampton agrees the Court presumes the jury follows the district court's
instructions, a mistrial necessarily recognizes that sometimes the jury cannot follow the district
court's instructions and completely disregard the sustained evidence. At a certain point, the
evidence becomes so prejudicial or inflammatory that no curative instruction can alleviate its
impact. If this were not the case, then there would be no need for a mistrial when such errors
could be resolved with jury instructions. Yet, with certain evidence, one cannot unring the bell.
A mistrial is necessary to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial with an unbiased jury. After
the irrelevant, prejudicial evidence in this case, Ms. Hampton no longer had that guarantee, and a
mistrial was necessary.
Finally, and related to the necessity of a mistrial and the futility of curative instructions,
Ms. Hampton turns to the State's position on the burdens to show harmlessness or reversible
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error in the district court's denial of a motion for a mistrial. (Resp. Br., p.13 n.6.) In State v.
Johnson, 163 Idaho 412 (2018), the Court stated the standard ofreview for the denial of a motion

for a mistrial is "reversible error." Id. at 420-21. On the matter of burdens, the Court stated:
"Where a criminal defendant shows a reversible error based on a contemporaneously objected-to
constitutional violation 'the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's
verdict."' Id. at 421 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,571 (2007)).
As stated in Johnson, Ms. Hampton has the burden to establish a reversible error-meaning she
must show an evidentiary error occurred and that error was "reversible," that is, one that affected
her substantive rights or the trial's outcome. See Reversible error, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) ("An error that affects a party's substantive rights or the case's outcome, and
thus is grounds for reversal if the party properly objected at trial.-Also termed harmful error;
prejudicial error; fatal error."). Ms. Hampton has met that burden. She established error in
Mr. Crumbley's testimony of her four arrest warrants in other counties and in Officer Rivers's
testimony of her past methamphetamine purchase. The State has not disputed this testimony was
improper. Ms. Hampton has also shown these errors are "reversible"-this was highly prejudicial
and irrelevant evidence of prior bad acts. This evidence affected her right to a fair trial.
Since Ms. Hampton met her burden, the burden shifts to the State to show the error was
harmless. Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421. As discussed above, the State has not met its burden to
show these evidentiary errors, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not contribute to the jury's verdict,
especially when the first piece of evidence (the four outstanding arrest warrants) was not limited
in its purpose for the jury's consideration. The jury could have considered this evidence for
Ms. Hampton's criminal propensity. Once the jury heard this evidence of four outstanding
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warrants, it is unreasonable to believe the jury was able to completely disregard evidence from a
police officer on Ms. Hampton's methamphetamine purchase. By this time in the trial, the
amount of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence presented to the jury on Ms. Hampton's character,
prior bad acts, and criminal propensity required a mistrial.
For these reasons, and those stated in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hampton maintains the
district court committed reversible error by denying her motion for a mistrial. (App. Br., pp.1218.)

III.
The State Did Not Prove Ms. Hampton Aided And Abetted Mr. Herrera In His Assault With A
Gun When The Evidence Showed Nothing More Than Her Mere Knowledge, Acquiescence, Or
Assent In His Crime
Lastly, the State argues the evidence was more than sufficient to prove Ms. Hampton
aided and abetted Mr. Herrera in his aggravated assault of Mr. White. (Resp. Br., pp.19-24.)
Ms. Hampton again respectfully disagrees.
As an initial matter, Ms. Hampton takes issue with the State's claim that she omitted the
fact that Ms. Hampton saw Mr. Herrera with his gun shortly before his assault of Mr. White.
(Resp. Br., pp.21-22; see Tr. Vol. II, p.370, L.19-p.372, L.1.) Ms. Hampton's omission of this
fact was not intentional. She maintains this fact is cumulative of other evidence recited in her
brief-Ms. Hampton saw Mr. Herrera with a gun before the theft. (App. Br., p.22.) Whether
Ms. Hampton knew Mr. Herrera had a gun hours or minutes before the theft is immaterial-it is
still mere knowledge. And mere knowledge is insufficient to prove aiding and abetting.
Ms. Hampton also submits Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), 1s
distinguishable because Rosemond required evidence of an affirmative act and intent of at a least
one element in "a two-element," "double-barreled crime." Id. at 71-72. The offense at issue in
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Rosemond prohibited (a) using or carrying a firearm when (b) engaging in a crime of violence or
a drug trafficking crime (in short, an armed drug deal). Id. at 71. The prosecution charged the
defendant with aiding and abetting this crime, but the defendant claimed he “took no action”
with respect to the gun and did not share the principal’s intent to use a gun. Id. at 71, 72, 79.
Rather, the defendant claimed he only acted and intended to participate in the drug deal part. Id.
at 71–72. The U.S. Supreme Court examined both the “affirmative act” and “requisite intent” for
an aider and abettor. Id. at 71–81. First, the U.S. Supreme Court held the evidence of the
defendant’s participation in the drug deal satisfied the affirmative act because the drug deal was
one element of the offense, and aiding and abetting principles did not require proof of
participation in each and every element. Id. at 72–76. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court held
evidence of the defendant’s advance knowledge of the principal carrying a gun during the drug
deal satisfied the intent element because he has actively participated in the criminal venture with
full knowledge of its scope. Id. at 77–78. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that advance
knowledge of the gun was critical because otherwise the defendant does not share the intent
element of an armed drug deal. Id. at 78–81. The defendant cannot make the choice to “up the
ante” if his knowledge of the gun “comes too late for him to be reasonably able to act upon it.”
Id. at 80–81. But, if the defendant has advance knowledge of the gun, he accepts the risk of the
“heightened stakes” and “penalties” when he decides “to stay in the game” and continue with the
drug deal. Id. at 80.
The State uses this intent discussion in Rosemond to show Ms. Hampton had advance
knowledge of Mr. Herrera’s gun and therefore was liable as an aider and abettor of his
aggravated assault against Ms. White. (Resp. Br., pp.23–24.) The problem, however, is that
Ms. Hampton did not engage in any affirmative act of the aggravated assault. To be sure, she
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does not challenge the jury's verdict with respect to aiding and abetting grand theft, but her
affirmative act with respect to grand theft does not satisfy the affirmative act requirement of the
assault. In Rosemond, the affirmative act was met by the defendant's participation in the drug
deal because the drug deal was one part of the armed drug deal offense. Id. at 71-75. Here, any
participation, encouragement, aid, or facilitation in the grand theft is not an affirmative act of
assault because grand theft is not a part of the assault offense. This is not an instance of a
"double-barreled crime," id. at 71, but two separate criminal offenses with separate elements.
Therefore, even with Ms. Hampton's knowledge of Mr. Herrera's gun, she did not actively
participate in the "criminal venture" to facilitate an assault. Her participation in grand theft
scheme does not satisfy the aiding and abetting elements of aggravated assault.
For these reasons, and those stated in the Appellant's Brief, (see App. Br., pp.19-23),
Ms. Hampton maintains the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the elements of
aiding and abetting aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Hampton respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case for a new trial in light of the evidentiary errors and denial of her mistrial
motion. She also respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and remand this case with instructions for the district
court to enter a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 16th day of July, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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